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ABSTRACT 
After the accident in Fukushima Daiichi NPP, the Nuclear Energy Agency Committee on the Safety 
of Nuclear Installations (OECD/NEA CSNI) initiated activities to address some technical issues. As 
a one of results, the Status report on Spent Fuel Pools (SFPs) under Loss of Cooling Accident 
Conditions was created. To give a valuable contribution to the post-Fukushima accident decision 
making process, brief summaries were produced on:  
- The status of SFP accident and mitigation strategies; 
- Assessment of current experimental and analytical knowledge about loss of cooling accidents 
in SFPs and their associated mitigation strategies; 
- The strengths and weaknesses of analytical methods used in codes to predict SFP accident 
evolution and assess the efficiency of different cooling mechanisms for mitigation of such 
accidents; 
- Identification of additional research activities required to address gaps in the understanding of 
relevant phenomenological processes, where analytical tool deficiencies exist, and to reduce 
the uncertainties in this understanding. 
The final report was approved by OECD/NEA CSNI in December 2014 with the reference 
NEA/CSNI/R(2015)2 and it is available for download on the OECD website http://www.oecd-
nea.org/nsd/docs/2015/csni-r2015-2.pdf.   
Joint Research Centre of European Commission took the leading role in creation of the chapter about 
possible accident scenarios, past accidents and precursor events. Evaluations of past events where 
SFP cooling has been lost show that malfunctions of the SFP cooling system are in most cases caused 
by inoperable cooling pumps. The other important causes are inadvertent diversion of coolant flow 
and Loss of ultimate heat sink.  
This paper is providing short general report overview and more details about JRC contribution. 
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Spent fuel pools (SFPs) are large accident-hardened structures that are used to temporarily store 
irradiated nuclear fuel. Due to the robustness of the structures, SFP severe accidents have long been 
regarded as highly improbable events, where there would be more than adequate time for corrective 
operator action. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident that followed after the Great East Japan 
Earthquake on 11 March, 2011, has renewed international interest in the safety of spent nuclear fuel 
stored in SFPs under prolonged loss of cooling conditions. 
Following the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, the Nuclear Energy Agency Committee 
on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (NEA CSNI) decided to launch several high-priority activities 
to address certain technical issues. Among other things, it was decided to prepare a Status Report on 
Spent Fuel Pools (SFPs) under loss of cooling accident conditions [1]. This activity was proposed 
jointly by the CSNI Working Group on Analysis and Management of Accidents (WGAMA) and the 
Working Group on Fuel Safety (WGFS). The main objectives, as defined by these working groups, 
were to:  
- Produce a brief summary of the status of SFP accident and mitigation strategies, to better 
contribute to the post-Fukushima accident decision making process; 
- Provide a brief assessment of current experimental and analytical knowledge about loss of 
cooling accidents in SFPs and their associated mitigation strategies; 
- Briefly describe the strengths and weaknesses of analytical methods used in codes to predict 
SFP accident evolution and assess the efficiency of different cooling mechanisms for 
mitigation of such accidents; 
- Identify and list additional research activities required to address gaps in the understanding of 
relevant phenomenological processes, to identify where analytical tool deficiencies exist, and 
to reduce the uncertainties in this understanding. 
The proposed activity was agreed and approved by CSNI in December 2012, and the first of four 
meetings of the appointed writing group was held in March 2013. The writing group consisted of 
members of the WGAMA and the WGFS, representing the European Commission and the following 
countries: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the USA. Status Report on SFP mostly covers the information provided by 
these countries. 
The final report was approved by OECD/NEA CSNI in December 2014 with the reference 
NEA/CSNI/R(2015)2 and it is available for download on the OECD website http://www.oecd-
nea.org/nsd/docs/2015/csni-r2015-2.pdf.  
Joint Research Centre of European Commission took the leading role in creation of the chapter about 
possible accident scenarios, past accidents and precursor events. Evaluations of past events where 
SFP cooling has been lost show that malfunctions of the SFP cooling system are in most cases caused 
by inoperable cooling pumps. The other important causes are inadvertent diversion of coolant flow 
and Loss of ultimate heat sink.  
Special attention is given to three fuel events that happen outside the reactor. Events from Paks NPP 
and Bruce-A NPP resulted in fuel damage were also outside SFP at the time of event, but those events 
are interesting because of similarity with conditions in SFP. Third event is about the most serious 
SFP scenario from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.  
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2. STATUS REPORT ON SFP UNDER LOSS OF COOLING AND LOSS OF COOLANT 
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS 
Status Report on SFP is intended to summarize current understanding of the behaviour of SFPs in 
loss of cooling and loss of coolant accident conditions. Past accidents and precursor events are 
reviewed, in particular the behaviour of the spent fuel facilities during the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident. Important aspects of the accidents and involved phenomena are addressed, such as the 
thermal-hydraulic behaviour of the pool, the issue of criticality, the accident progression under partial 
or complete loss of coolant, the hydrogen risk, the fission product release, etc. The report provides a 
brief assessment of current experimental knowledge about loss of cooling and loss of coolant 
accidents. It also presents state-of-the-art computer codes used for analyses of SFP accidents, and 
discusses strengths and weaknesses of models and methods used in these codes. The probability of 
SFP accidents and assessments of off-site health effects and contamination consequences of SFP 
accidents are, however, beyond the scope of this document. 
The fuel residing in At-Reactor (AR) SFPs is usually characterized by higher decay power than fuel 
stored in Away-From-Reactor (AFR) pools. Since the progression rate and severity of a loss of 
cooling/coolant accident correlates with the power of the stored fuel assemblies (FAs), the most 
challenging accident scenarios are expected in AR storage pools. For this reason, the report focuses 
on AR SFPs in light-water reactor (LWR) and Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor nuclear 
power plants.  
The report is also aimed to identify areas that need additional knowledge and to identify potential 
improvements in computational models and tools for better predictions of SFP accident progression 
and time margins to significant radiological releases. Better understanding of the SFP accidents 
phenomenology and coolability mechanisms is needed for reliable estimation of accident progression 
and radiological consequence. 
3. SPENT FUEL POOLS DESIGN 
A typical design of the SFP in pressurized water reactors (PWRs) is shown in Figure 1, whereas 
Figure 2 shows a typical pool design for boiling water reactors (BWRs). The pools are constructed of 
reinforced concrete with a stainless steel liner to prevent leakage and maintain water quality. The 
pools are envisaged to withstand design-basis seismic events.  
Each plant has a source of high purity water to fill the SFP, referred to in nuclear power plants as 
make-up. The preferred sources are usually the refuelling water storage tank for PWRs and the 
condensate storage tank for BWRs. The normal make-up is through a connection from the water 
source to the suction of the SFP cooling system pumps, and local valve operations are needed to 
initiate SFP make-up. The make-up rates among plants have a wide range. Plants also have alternate 
methods to provide make-up, if normal make-up is unavailable, and may include the service water 
system and the fire water system. 
For BWRs, the SFP is generally located within the reactor building, but outside of the primary 
containment. Also for PWRs, the SFP is usually located outside the containment, but adjacent to it in 
a separate fuel handling building or within the auxiliary building. Exceptions are the Russian VVER-
1000 design, the German Kraftwerk Union (KWU) KONVOI or pre-KONVOI PWR design, and the 
AREVA EPR design, where the SFP is located inside the containment. 
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Figure 1: Generic SFP design for PWRs 
 
 
Figure 2: Generic SFP design for BWRs 
Typically, SFPs in light water reactors are about 12 m deep and vary in width and length. The fuel is 
stored in stainless steel (SS) racks that are submerged with approximately 7 m of water above the top 
of the stored fuel. The water in the SFP of a BWR is demineralized water, whereas PWRs and VVERs 
use borated water. In addition to cooling, the SFP water inventory provides radiological shielding for 
personnel in the fuel pool area and adjacent areas. Shielding is also provided by the thick concrete 
walls of the SFP. Each plant generally has technical specification requirements for water temperature 
and level, and for the margin to criticality for the fuel stored in the SFP. 
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4. SPENT FUEL POOL OPERATING EVENTS 
Status Report on SFP describes selected events where the cooling of pools or part of their water 
inventory is lost are described. We can say that no major events occurred, i.e., events with significant 
consequences related to SFP loss-of-cooling have not happened. However, the described events 
illustrate different scenarios in which SFP cooling or water level was affected, and in escalated 
scenarios, it could result in fuel damage. Therefore, the described events are selected such that 
difference in their nature is emphasized rather than level of significance. 
4.1. Fuel related events 
In 2009, the European Clearinghouse on NPP Operational Experience Feedback performed a study 
on events reported in the IAEA International Reporting System for Operating Experience [2] related 
to nuclear fuel. The SFP related events causes relate to human errors and, to a lesser extent, design 
deficiencies. Some of these deficiencies originated from the initial design of the SFP, but in some 
occasions, the design deficiencies derived from a change in the characteristics of the stored fuel (e.g. 
higher enrichment and burn-up, re-racking). 
In the study [2], 28 events have been identified to be related to fuel integrity in storage facilities, 
mainly in the SFP. According to their nature, they have been classified in events related to Loss of 
cooling; Loss of margin to criticality; Fuel integrity, and Radiological impact.  
Events with loss of cooling (including SFP water level drops) (Table 1) are relatively the most 
frequent ones, and are caused or related to configuration control of the SFP cooling system 
(interconnections and manual operation), leakages in the liner, and the lack of monitoring systems, 
so detection of the problem could be delayed. This group of events includes all the events that have 
originated from any kind of loss of cooling capacity, either cooling system equipment malfunction or 
loss of coolant (significant drop of the fuel pool water level). It should be remarked that these events 
are slow, and there is usually enough time to restore the cooling function. 
 
Table 1: Some past events related to loss of SFP cooling 




Loss of shutdown cooling due to 
station blackout during refuelling 
outage 
Loss of off-site power 








Dual unit loss of off-site power 
resulting from inadequate relay 
modification 
Loss of off-site power 
resulted in loss of SFP 
cooling. 





Emergency diesel generators  
failed to start after undetected loss 
of two phases on 400 kV incoming 
off-site supply 
Loss of two phases on 400 
kV off-site power resulted 
in loss of SFP cooling. 
Loss of SFP cooling 
capability with no 





Irradiated fuel, both in the vessel 
and the SFP, without forced 
cooling during refuelling outage 
Loss of component cooling 
water system capability. 
SFP cooling was lost 
for 7 hours and 
temperature increased 




Disruption of the SFP cooling Fire in the pump room of 
one of the two SFP cooling 
system trains, while the 
other was out of order. 
Simultaneous failure 
of SFP cooling trains, 
for 6 hours and then 
for 15 hours. 
SONGS 2, 
USA, 
Inoperable SFP cooling pumps 
results in loss of safety function 
One SFP cooling pump out 
of service and the other 
SFP temperature  
increased slightly. 
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NPP, type Event Cause Consequences 





Both trains of SFP cooling 
inoperable results in a loss of 
safety function 
Salt water cooling system 
low flow affected 







Drop in the level of the wet 
refuelling pool and flooding of 
reactor building areas 
Inappropriate valve 
maintenance activities 
caused leak through open 
joint on one SFP valve. 
Significant drop in the 
level of the wet 




Insufficient testing of functionality 
of siphon breaker valve at spent 
fuel basin  
Lack in inspection 
program. 
None*. 
Cattenom 2 and 
3, France, 
PWR 
"Siphon breaker" missing on SFP 
cooling systems pipes 
Injection pipe could 
extract the water from the 
pool through a siphon 
effect. 
None*  
* Design/Inspections changes implemented later to prevent potential uncontrolled drainage of SFP. 
Events with radiological impact are also relatively frequent, due to the numerous activities and 
circumstances that could lead to radiological exposure of the workers. It should be noted that 
radiological exposure in this context does not mean fuel overheating and radioactive release from 
damaged fuel. The main cause of these events is activities in the SFP building, not carefully planned 
and analysed to identify all possible sources of radiological exposure (risk analysis). 
Events with a reduction in the margin to criticality and events with fuel integrity concerns are rare, 
and their specific causes are erroneous concentrations of boron, incidents with inadequate neutron 
absorbers in structures, errors in the calculation of the margin to criticality, or failure in the control 
and monitoring of the SFP water chemistry. Restoring the boron concentration, repairing the neutron 
absorber in the structures, and correcting the calculations are sufficient to recover the criticality 
margin. 
4.2. Fukushima Daiichi accident 
The Great East Japan Earthquake took place on 11 March 2011, and the resulting tsunami caused loss 
of emergency diesel powered AC generators and produced conditions known as station blackout 
(SBO) at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS). As results of the SBO, the emergency 
cooling systems and water supply systems failed and the three Units 1 to 3 subsequently suffered 
severe core damage. 
Following the loss of all AC power at Units 1 to 5, the SFP cooling flow was lost in the Unit 1 to Unit 
4 SFPs, while the Unit 6 air-cooled emergency diesel generator survived the tsunami and was used 
to maintain cooling and water supply for the Unit 5 and Unit 6 SFPs [3]. With no pool cooling to 
remove decay heat at the Unit 1 to Unit 4 SFPs, emergency water injection was conducted by using 
a helicopter, a concrete pump truck, a fire truck, and the make-up water condensate or SFP cooling 
and cleanup system line. Eventually, pool water cooling by the alternative cooling system was started 
at Unit 1 to Unit 6 SFPs, and the water temperature has then been maintained below 40 °C, which is 
a typical SFP temperature. Video inspections reveal that the fuel racks appear to be intact, and water 
analyses indicate that fuel damage in the pools is unlikely. Hence, there is no evidence that the fuel 
in the pools was damaged. 
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The most serious scenario happened in unit 4 SFP.  Around 15:35 on 11 March, the SFP 4 lost all AC 
power when EDGs stopped functioning as the seawater pumps and power panels were flooded by the 
tsunami. The cooling and water supply for the SFP likewise failed. Around 6:00 on 15 March, the 
reactor building was damaged by a hydrogen explosion, and a large amount of debris dropped into 
the pool. On 16 March, a helicopter flew close to the operating floor of Unit 4, at which time the 
water surface of the pool could be seen, but no exposed fuel was observed. 
According to the original schedule, the drain of the reactor vessel and reactor well should have been 
completed by 7 March 2011, but the operations were delayed and the reactor well was still filled with 
water on March 11 [4] [5]. This situation played an important role during the course of the accident 
and significantly slowed the decrease of the SFP 4 water level: the water-tightness of the pool gate 
was lost due to the pressure from the reactor well side as the SFP water level became low. It induced 
a water inflow from the reactor well to the pool. 
At first, the water inflow from the reactor well was not considered and it was estimated that the fuel 
would be uncovered by late March. Therefore, from 20 March, water was added via helicopter, fire 
truck, and concrete pump truck. Eventually, the water level reduced to 1.5 m above the top of the fuel 
racks as the amount of evaporation was larger than the water injection, including water inflow from 
the reactor well, until around 20 April, as shown in Figure 3[3]. 
Figure 3. Evaluated water level and water temperature in the SFP 4 by TEPCO 
The assumptions made in the estimation are as follows: 
- The water level is assumed to have been reduced by 1.5 m as a result of sloshing by the earthquake 
and the explosion. 
- Inflow from the reactor well occurred before 22 April. The water level was calculated by considering 
the water in the pool and the reactor well and dryer and separator pit collectively. After 22 April, the 
pool gate was closed, and no inflow from the reactor well was considered. 
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Later, intensive water injection conducted between 22 and 27 April succeeded in recovering the water 
level to the full capacity. The water injection was then suspended until 5 May to study the trend of 
the reducing water level. Subsequently, the water level recovered again to full capacity by intensive 
water injection, and then the water level is considered to be maintained at near full capacity by 
repeated reduction and recover due to evaporation and water injection. 
On 31 July, pool water cooling by the alternative cooling system was started. The pool water 
temperature was around 75 °C when the cooling was started and reached a steady condition on 3 
August when the water temperature stabilized at about 40 °C. 
4.3. The Bruce-A Unit 4 fuel transfer incident 
On 1983 November, a CANDU 37-element fuel bundle was overheated in steam-air environment in 
the fuel transfer mechanism of Bruce-A Unit 4 reactor, Canada [6]. This event differs from the case 
of loss of coolant in CANDU SFP because there were no neighbouring fuel bundles, and the decay 
heat was higher than expected for a bundle in a CANDU SFP. Also, the temperatures at the end-plates 
were lower than the temperatures in the rest of the bundle. 
Bundle G70551W was a standard 37-element Bruce Nuclear Generating Station bundle irradiated to 
an average burnup of 5.9 MWd/kgU at an average outer element power of 41 kW/m. It was discharged 
from the reactor as part of normal scheduled fuelling. The bundle was kept in the fuelling machine 
under heavy water cooling for about 2 hours before discharge to the fuel transfer chamber. Because 
of problems with other equipment, the bundle was left on the cradle in the flooded fuel transfer 
chamber for many hours. The vent valve was left closed, so injection of air from the instrumentation 
bubbler formed an air space in the top of the chamber, which slowly uncovered the bundle. After the 
bundle was uncovered, local boiling would also have occurred, which could have displaced further 
water from the chamber. The bundle was probably partly uncovered for a total of 5 hours; the vent 
valve was opened once during the incident, which would have re-flooded the bundle. The incident 
was terminated when the fuel port seal was opened, submerging the bundle and releasing airborne 
activity from the chamber. 
Sheath oxidation was more rapid at the bearing pad braze heat affected zones. At the central bearing 
pad plane of the bundle, the sheaths of 22 of the 37 elements (in the upper and central parts of the 
bundle) were severely oxidized, and in many cases were ballooned and distorted. Hydriding was 
found in the unoxidized part of some sheaths. The inner elements had degraded into rubble. None of 
the sheath oxides had a columnar structure, so the bundle temperatures probably did not exceed 
1050°C. Melting of a few of the beryllium brazes indicated temperatures above 970°C. Oxidation of 
the sheath inner walls and of the UO2 was minimal, so the air was probably rapidly deoxygenated by 
the Zircaloy oxidation. Also, fuel-sheath interaction was not observed. 
4.4. The Paks cleaning tank incident 
On April 10, 2003, during refuelling outage in the Paks unit 2, Hungary, 30 spent fuel assemblies 
were being cleaned in a special container in the fuel manipulation pit of the SFP. After completing 
the cleaning process, the fuel was left in the container with reduced cooling, which resulted later in 
severe cladding oxidation and fuel damage [7][8].  
The cleaning system consisted of a container installed in a pit for fuel manipulations connected via a 
lock to the SFP, interconnecting lines, heat exchangers and filter equipment (Figure 4). This technical 
system formed an internal closed circuit almost completely submerged into water, except for the heat 
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exchangers and filters that were located on the reactor desk or beside it. The container received 30 
assemblies for cleaning at a time, and the cleaning process was performed by circulation for about 
35-40 hours. During the annual outage of Paks unit 2, altogether 210 FAs, i.e. assemblies for 7 
containers, were scheduled to be cleaned. 
The cleaning programme for the sixth batch of FAs loaded into the cleaning tank was completed by 
16:55 on April 10. The fuel was not removed from the cleaning tank immediately, since the crane 
was busy with other tasks. The coolant was circulated by a submergible pump with much lower mass 
flow rate than used in the cleaning process (Figure 4). Contracted specialists continuously maintained 
the cooling of the cleaning tank at 37 °C. At 21:53, activity was detected by the krypton measurement 
system installed in the cleaning circuit, and at the same time, the 'alarm' level was reached by the 
noble gas activity concentration monitors in the reactor hall, and then the operational dosimetry 
systems installed in the ventilation stack indicated abrupt increase of noble gas activity (max. 
0.2×1013 Bq/10 min). The plant supervisor ordered to terminate the work carried out in the reactor 
building and to leave the area. An extraordinary maintenance committee was called, in order to 
evaluate the event and to take necessary actions. As highest priority, it was decided to open the 
cleaning tank, to carry out visual inspection, and if possible, to separate the nonhermetic FA and also 
to analyse the water quality. 
 
 
Figure 4: Arrangement of the cleaning tank cooling during cleaning (left) and post-cleaning (right) [7]. 
 
The cleaning tank head was unlocked by a contractor at 02:15, April 11. Immediately after this, an 
activity increase was observed in the dosimetry control and monitoring system) and, at the same time, 
the water level in the SFP lowered by approximately 7 cm. The first results of water chemistry 
analysis identified the fission products 134Cs, 137Cs, 131I, 132I, 133Xe and 85Kr in the samples at activity 
level of 104-107 Bq/kg. Activity of less volatile species was also detected in the water samples [9]. 
During the cleaning tank head removal operation, one of the three cables of the lifting tackle broke, 
thus the head removal failed. The head was lifted on April 16, 2003, and the inspection was performed 
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with video camera. The damage of the fuel assemblies was seen to be more severe than assumed 
before. 
Later inspection has revealed that, due to the special design of the cleaning tank and the characteristics 
of the fuel assemblies, the cooling by the submersible pump of lower mass flow was insufficient. The 
low flow rate pump was not capable of removing the decay heat (241 kW) due to a by-pass effect. 
The temperature stratification blocked the flow, and therefore, the coolant temperature reached 
saturation temperature in the upper part of the cleaning tank. Then, the steam-formation pushed the 
main volume of the coolant out of the cleaning tank vessel. This way, the FAs were left without 
proper cooling for hours and heated up to above 1000 °C, which resulted in severe damage and 
oxidation of the FAs. Oxidation in high temperature steam and hydrogen uptake resulted in 
embrittlement of the fuel assembly shrouds and the fuel rod cladding. When opening the cleaning 
tank, the injection of cold coolant caused the breaking up of the embrittled shrouds and fuel rod 
cladding. 
Video examination indicated that most of the fuel assemblies suffered damage. Brittle failure and 
fragmentation of FAs were observed. Above the upper plate, several assembly heads were broken, 
standing in inclined position. One assembly header was found far from its original place. Many FAs 
were broken and fragmented also below the upper plate, and some assemblies were fractured in their 
entirety. Fuel rod fragments and shroud pieces accumulated on the lower plate between the FAs. 
Many fuel rod pieces and fragments of assembly shroud were dispersed within the tank. Some fuel 
pellets fell out of fuel rods, their form remained mainly intact. Heavy oxidation of the zirconium 
components was identified. Less oxidation was found in the periphery than in the centre, and the 
bottom part of the fuel remain intact. The radioactive noble gases that escaped from the damaged FAs 
were released into the environment through the reactor hall stack with negligible impact on the 
environment. Most of the non-gaseous fission products were trapped by the large water mass of the 
pool, and removed by the water purification system [9]. 
The OECD-IAEA Paks Fuel Project was performed to support the understanding of fuel behaviour 
in accident conditions on the basis of analyses of the Paks incident. Computer simulations of the most 
relevant aspects of the event and comparisons of the calculated results with the available information 
were carried out between 2006 and 2007. The numerical analyses improved the understanding of the 
Paks incident and helped to make more precise some parameters of the incident, such as: 
- the by-pass flow at low flow rate amounted to 75-90 % of the inlet flow rate, which led to the 
formation of a steam volume; 
- the maximum temperature in the tank was between 1200 and 1400 ºC; 
- the degree of zirconium oxidation reached 4-12 %; 
- the mass of produced hydrogen was between 3 and 13 kg. 
The OECD-IAEA Paks Fuel Project improved the current knowledge on fuel behaviour under 
accident conditions, and led to recommendations for some further actions for research in this area. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Adequate cooling of the spent fuel in the SFP can principally be lost either by malfunction of the pool 
cooling system or by loss of the pool water inventory. In the Status report on SFPs under Loss of 
Cooling Accident Conditions examples are given for both types of events. The chosen events are not 
the most significant ones, but they present different possible scenarios that lead or could lead to loss 
of spent fuel cooling. 
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Losing the cooling of the SFP in a nuclear power plant is an event mostly connected with inability of 
SFP cooling pumps to operate. This is often caused by loss of electrical supply to pumps. Usually, if 
the loss of off-site power occurs, manual action is needed to connect back-up electrical supply. If 
back-up electrical supply is unavailable, the pumps cannot operate and the temperature of the pool 
will consequentially start to increase. In evaluated recent events, electrical supply became available 
and cooling continued well before the SFP water reached the maximum allowed temperature. 
The most serious SFP scenario from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident studies showed several 
latent weaknesses that could result in fuel uncovery in SFP 4 and damage. This was the main reason 
why interest in the safety of spent nuclear fuel stored in SFPs under prolonged loss of cooling 
conditions increased. 
Although Paks and Bruce incidents cannot be considered as a typical SFP accident, they gave insights 
that can be useful for understanding phenomena related to SFP loss of cooling/coolant accidents. 
They also prompted research about such accidents.  
An improved understanding of the phenomenology of SFP accidents and coolability mechanisms, 
along with a consensual view of the extent of remaining uncertainties, are indispensable for reliable 
estimation of accident progression and radiological consequence. 
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